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Recent econometric studies only emphasize the role of long-term demand expectations and
technological capability. They neglect the impact of buyer market structure on innovative
efforts of input suppliers. This paper deals with the effects of supplier and buyer market
concentration, and appropriability conditions on the innovative behavior of suppliers within
the German automobile industry. The data set contains firms from all size classes and
measures of innovation input as well as innovation output. It can be shown that a) innovation
and R&D-employment intensity will decline (increase) in buyer concentration if supplier
markets are low (high) concentrated, b) buyers’ pressure on input prices reduces suppliers’
innovation expenditures and their incentive to develop new products, c) a small number of
competitors in domestic and foreign suppliers markets and a large stock of customers
stimulates innovative behavior, d) small and medium sized suppliers invest more in their
innovation activities but have lower probabilities to realize innovations than larger firms, and
f) higher technological capabilities lead to a higher innovation input and output.
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I. Introduction
In the past, the empirical literature had concentrated primarily on the effects of market
concentration, technological opportunities, demand and appropriability conditions on the
innovation activities of firms (Cohen 1995). The results were heavily discussed (Acs and
Audretsch 1990; Frisch 1993). While in the 60’s and 70’s market power and firm size in the
tradition of Schumpeter (1948) were said to have a significant impact on innovation activities
(Cohen et al. 1987; Geroski 1990), in the last few years the recognition rose that it is the
technological opportunity of markets and technological spillovers which influence innovative
behavior significantly (Arvanitis and Hollenstein 1994; Geroski 1992; Klevorick et al. 1995;
König and Licht 1995; Levin 1988). Other studies confirm that long-term demand
expectations positively influence the innovation investments of firms (Cohen et al. 1987;
Schmookler 1966).
But one issue has not yet been thoroughly explored in the econometric innovation literature. In
some industries, such as electronics, chemicals, synthetics, and automobiles, also the
conditions on vertically related markets determine the innovation activities of firms. Because
firms’ cost of production, time of development and/or quality of new products depend on the
innovation activities of firms operating in vertically related markets, they have incentives to
control the development process on these markets (Geroski 1992). The empirical case studies
of von Hippel (1988) show that innovation efforts as well as appropriability conditions of
input suppliers are influenced by firms on buyer markets. On the one hand, the buyers pass
relevant technological information on to suppliers (Robertson and Langlois 1995). But on the
other hand, they have an incentive to limit the appropriability of their suppliers by price
discrimination, short-term contracts or by restricting property rights (Williamson 1975).
This paper deals with the effects of buyer concentration and demand power on the innovation
activities of automobile suppliers, in view of the structure and the technological opportunities
and technological capabilities on the supplier markets. On this issue only Farber (1981)
provides insight into the impacts of buyer concentration on the R&D efforts of input suppliers.
He considers several effects of buyer concentration on suppliers’ expected profits of
innovation (e.g. royality appropriability, speed of invention adoption). By estimating a
simultaneous equation system for market concentration, advertising intensity, and R&D
intensity, he finds significant effects of buyer concentration on R&D efforts for fifty U.S.
four-digit industries. The data support his hypothesis, that sellers’ R&D activities decline with
buyer concentration for unconcentrated seller industries, and may increase with buyer
concentration for concentrated seller industries.
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In this paper we estimate the effects of market power of buyers on the innovation input (R&D
employment intensity and innovation expenditure per unit of sales) and on the innovation
output (realization of product and process innovation) of German automobile suppliers. In this
sector market power of buyers is a traditional problem (Mendius 1991). We use indicators
representing the structures on the supplier and buyer markets as well as the behavior of buyers
influencing the appropriability of the suppliers’ innovation rents. The data are derived from a
sample survey conducted in the German automobile industry in 1995, representing 401
automobile suppliers out of sixteen four digit industries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II some peculiarities of the (German) automobile
industry are briefly mentioned with special attention to buyer-supplier relationships. Next,
some relevant theoretical implications are made regarding the effects of demand power on
innovation rent expectation and appropriability conditions. In section IV the data are described
with consideration of the innovation indicators used. The estimation methods and results are
depicted in section V. Section VI summarizes the main findings.
II. Market Power of Buyers in the German Automobile Industry
All over the world, the automobile industry is very heterogeneous because automobiles consist
of “as many as 20,000 parts that must all work together as an integrated unit” (Liker et al.
1996, p.60). The automobile industry comprises a variety of buyer and supplier markets
according to different business units (e.g. motors, tires, electronic components, plastics,
glasses, forging dies). Most of the supplier markets are operated by small and medium sized
firms. For example, in 1995, about 60 percent of the German automobile suppliers had less
than 500 employees, wheras most of the smaller suppliers have only few buyers of their
products (Peters 1996; Scientific Consulting 1995). In average, buyers of automobile parts
(automakers or other large automobile suppliers) are larger than their input suppliers and have
a high share of suppliers’ sales. But in the German automobile industry also smaller suppliers
which are exposed to a low market power of large buyers can be found.
The view demand power is a traditional problem in the (German) automobile industry
(Mendius 1991) is supported by the fact that suppliers have to make transaction-specific
investments in developing and producing automobile parts. The high degree of asset-specifity
often implicates monopsonistic market relationships between automobile suppliers and their
buyers. In addition, because amongst variables such as functional performance of new
automobiles, the price is one of the most important factors on which automakers compete
worldwide, automakers attempt to minimize the costs of their inputs. As a result, buyers on
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets often use their bargaining power to lower prices or to
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change the regularity of delivery when dealing with small automobile suppliers operating in
competitive markets (Nagel et al. 1989).
In recent years, automakers have changed their strategies in developing and producing new
automobiles (Dyer 1996; Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). Most of the R&D- and production-
activities formerly done in-house have been outsourced to external suppliers. In the early 90’s,
up to 70-75% in the case of Japan, up to 50-70% in Germany, and up to 35% of the
automobiles in the US are developed and manufactered by suppliers (Clark und Fujimoto
1991; Meissner et al. 1994; Smitka 1991). Nowadays, German automakers buy more parts
from outside. Suppliers have more responsibilities for product development (e.g. for
designing, R&D, prototyping and testing) which seems to have positive impacts on their
innovation efforts. But because of global sourcing, the bargaining power of automakers haver
further increased.
The restructuring of the development and production process along the value-added line
changes the structure and competition on the supplier markets. First, automakers reduced the
number of suppliers to which they maintain direct transactions to realize returns of scale. They
integrate less suppliers in the product development and (in some cases) have formed vertical
corporate networks with first-tier, second-tier and third-tier suppliers. There is evidence that
first-tier suppliers are involved earlier in product development, receive more technical
information, use longer-terms contracts, and are supported more intensively by their buyers in
the generation of new products than other suppliers (Becker and Peters 1997). Other suppliers
are further used predominantly as low-cost subcontractors under short terms, arm’s length
contracts which handle blue-prints.
Second, the restructuring caused a process of cooperations and mergers among suppliers,
producing substitutionary or complementary inputs. By acquisition of other firms, suppliers
tried to enlargen their inhouse capacities in developing subsystems (rather than parts) to get
first-tier suppliers and to build up a countervailing power position against the automakers.
In summary, it can be stated that at the beginning of the 90’s, the buyer-supplier relationship
in the German automobile industry, and especially the organizational structure of the
automobile supply industry have changed remarkably. But the question, which implications
does the vertical organization of structural dependencies and especially the demand power of
buyers have on the innovation activities of input suppliers, is still unanswered.
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III. Buyer and Supplier Market Power and Conditions of Appropriability
In the literature, the effects of demand conditions on innovation and R&D activities are
mostly treated in the light of the demand-pull hypothesis in the tradition of Schmookler
(1966). Contrary to the technology-push hypothesis the firms' evaluations regarding future
sales and marketing expectations of new products and processes affect their innovation
activities. Both the introduction of innovations and the firms' willingness to carry out
innovation activities depend on the expected profitability. Apart from the demand conditions
which are determined by the product life cycle, and therefore, by the degree of saturation of
markets (Utterback and Abernathy 1975) profit expectations of suppliers in intermediate good
sectors seem to be influenced by the structure of the buyer markets and by the behavior of the
buyers of innovations (von Hippel 1988). Both aspects describe the market power of buyers.
As no specific theoretical frameworks to handle the impact of buyer concentration on
innovation efforts of firms exist, we present some theoretical explanations to the role of buyer
market power for the innovation behavior on input markets.1 There is particular emphasis on
the interaction between supply and buyer market structure. It is assumed that the incentive to
innovate is entirely driven by profit expectations, and that most of the innovations are custom-
tailored.
Expectation of Demand Changes
For sellers of innovations it is easier to evaluate future changes in demand and to address
customers’ needs, if they transact to high-concentrated buyer markets because they have to
satisfy only the needs of few large buyers. Regarding to the life-cycle hypothesis of Utterback
and Abernathy (1975), the diversity of competing versions of products and the number of
(major) innovations declines with higher concentration (Klepper 1996). Thus, the risk of
innovation failure for suppliers decreases, if only a small number of buyers operate in high-
concentrated markets. Christensen and Bower’s (1996) study on the influence of relevant
buyers for a successful introduction of technological innovations in the world disk drive
industry gives evidence for this argument. They find that "when a proposed innovation
addresses the needs of small customers in remote or emerging markets that do not supply a
significant share of the resources a firm currently needs for growth and survival, firms will
find it difficult to succeed even at innovations that are technologically straightforward”
(Christensen and Bower 1996, p. 199).
                    
1 Some of the arguments are derived from the investigation of Farber (1981).
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Order Size
Large firms in high-concentrated buyer markets are more able to demand products of higher
order sizes than small firms on low-concentrated buyer markets. If the realization of returns of
scale in the production of new inputs is most important (e.g. in the automobile industry)
buyers share their factor demand on one large supplier rather than on several small suppliers.
Given the schedule of delivery, larger order sizes give suppliers more certainty in their output
of the new products and higher incentives to invest in R&D. In addition, large order sizes
seem to stimulate firms’ efforts to engage in R&D for process innovations. Based on the
theory of industry evolution, Klepper (1996) states that the value of a unit cost reduction
achieved through new processes is proportional to the level of output sold by the firm.2
Diffusion Rate of Innovations
The potential of innovation returns is also determined by the speed of adoption whereas the
seller of innovation prefers low (high) rate of adoption on the seller (buyer) markets.
Regarding the positive interactions between seller (supplier) and buyer concentration, Farber
(1981) points out the inverse relationship between seller and buyer power on the rate of
diffusion of new knowledge. Firms in monopolistic markets have higher abilities to errect
entry barriers, which reduce the rate of diffusion (Geroski 1990; Gilbert and Newberry 1982).
In addition, Leibenstein (1969) argues that monopolists face X-efficiencies in form of
inflexibilities in the adoption of new technologies. The time-lag between imitation and
innovation increases with higher concentration, which implicates a lower speed of diffusion
and a lower rate of imitation. A lower rate of adoption on the supplier market has a positive
impact on firms’ innovation efforts because it leads to a reduction of the discount rate and to
increasing returns. A lower rate of imitation on the buyer market reduces the expected profit
stream of innovation and therefore reduce the innovation activitities of suppliers. But Farber
(1981, p.338) believes: “If the speed of adoption declines with the concentration of buyers,
buyer market concentration may have a negative effect on inventive and innovative activity
where the seller’s market is more competitive.”
Licensing Contract Design and Royalty Appropriability
The effects of buyer market structure on the innovative efforts of suppliers may be explained
by following the theory of efficient licensing contracts. Farber (1981) remarks that the
licensor’s choice of the optimal compensation schedule (fixed or variable fees) depends on the
structure on the licensee markets, which has certain effects on the profit expectations of the
supplier (Shapiro 1985). The literature of efficient licensing puts strong emphasis on fixed
                    
2 But Klepper (1996, p. 365) further assumes that the incentive for product innovation is conditioned by the
demand of new buyers. Thus, the number of (major) product innovations tends to increase in the number of
buyers. But it has to be remarked that Klepper looks at major innovations rather than incremental innovations.
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fees. A royalty will affects firms’ behavior since it increases the marginal costs of using the
innovation. A fixed fee has no effect on the decision of the licensee and avoids the need to
monitor the use of the innovation by the licensee. But under certain conditions (risk sharing) it
may be optimal for the supplier to choose royalties for innovations (Kamien 1992). But in a
simple formal model of linear demand, Demsetz (1969) shows that in the case of innovations,
which reduce the production cost of buyers, the optimum rent potential is at least as great for a
monopolistic buyer industry as for a competitive buyer industry of the same size and cost
assumptions. Therefore, the potential for licence fees from cost-reducing innovations is
higher, the more concentrated the buyer markets. In the case of innovations which are
demand-improving for the customers, the topic is more complex and ambiguous (Farber 1981,
p. 337). Only with constant costs, imperfect licence discrimination, and sufficiently high
demand improvement on the buyer markets coming from suppliers’ innovations, licence fees
on monopolistic buyer markets exceed licence revenues on low-concentrated buyer markets.3
Up to this point, only the effects of the buyer market power on the potential of innovation
profits are described. Apart from the size of the innovation returns the ac ual realization (the
appropriability) of innovation returns is influenced by the behavior of buyers. Assuming the
ability to licence new technological knowledge and assuming the suppliers’ ability to
discriminate licences, demand power of buyers not only determines the choice of an
appropriate compensation scheme but also - given the type of the licence fee - the size of the
innovation returns. For example, negotiation power of buyers can spoil the size of the fixed
quantity fee. Farber (1981, p. 338) remarks: “The relative bargaining powers of buyer and
seller of the innovation will determine the share of the rent which is appropriable by the
innovator. As the relative bargaining power of the buyer increases, the appropriability of the
rent declines.”
Countervailing Power
Within the automobile industry price discrimination plays an important role. According to
Lustgarten (1975) monopsonistic buyers can discriminate prices more easily between their
suppliers than buyers who act on lowly concentrated markets. This does not only effect the
price evaluation of short-term market transactions, but also the design of incomplete long-term
contracts (Klein et al. 1978; Williamson 1975). So, after the completion of customer specific
                    
3 The theoretical framework of efficient licensing contracts is of minor relevance for the German automobile
industry, because patents are an inefficient appropriability mechanism of innovation rent (Greif and Potkowik
1990). More often, automakers formally or informally insist on a sole right of disposal for their suppliers’
developments, giving the suppliers a temporal right of producing the new inputs. Also, in some cases, certain
parts of the suppliers’ developments have to be done directly on the blue prints of the buyers (Nagel et al. 1989).
This does not allow patenting on the supplier side any more as well as certainty on future delivery of the own-
developed products is not assured either. However, the probability of such a behavior of buyers may decrease
with the market power of suppliers.
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innovations, long-term contracts cannot prevent powerful buyers from pushing through ex-
post price negotiations, leading to price reductions despite constant contract periods. But
rational acting suppliers will anticipate the opportunistic behavior of the buyers, reducing their
R&D-investments to a level by which the marginal return of R&D equalizes the marginal cost
of R&D. Because the marginal return of R&D declines with market power of buyers, the
innovative efforts of suppliers will be reduced.
In general price discrimination requires to a certain degree incomplete competition on the
supplier markets. Only then, factor prices can be pushed towards marginal costs via demand
power, deteriorating the conditions to appropriate for the innovators. But the negative effects
of opportunistic behavior of buyers seems to be higher for low-concentrated seller markets
rather than for high-concentrated seller markets. High concentrations on both related markets
implicate a countervailing power situation (Galbraith 1956; Soldatos 1994) or a double-sided
small number situation (Williamson 1975), which reduce the incentives of buyers to behave
opportunistic and to carry out price discrimination.
Vertical Corporate Networks
Surveys on the role of corporate networks in the innovation process, controlled and lead by
dominant buyers, emphasize the influence of positive interactions in concentrated markets
(Jarillo 1995, McMillan 1990). Most of the networks reveal a decentralized and pyramidal
structure, showing large firms in concentrated markets on the last stages of production. Due to
this market constellation of a double-sided small number situation suppliers seem to have the
necessary security to carry out risky and technologically complex innovations. The network
theory emphasizes that on the basis of rational and economical confidence between sellers and
buyers long-term contracts are established, favoring the exchange of information between the
partners and promoting innovation activities (Freeman 1991; Robertson and Langlois 1995).
In examining the role of R&D-spillovers within vertical networks in the German automobile
supply industry, Becker and Peters (1997) find support for this view. Buyers of automobile
parts share more R&D-stimulating information with suppliers which are members of
corporate networks than with suppliers to which they have only loose relationships. In
addition, they observe that members of corporate networks operate in higher concentrated
markets and focus their activities on less customers than non-members.
In summary, the various theoretical explanations suggest positive as well as negative impacts
of buyer market power on innovative efforts of suppliers. The sign of the influences depends
on the rate of concentration in the supplier markets. As Farber (1981, p. 338) argues: “In the
case where seller market power is low, increased buyer market power may reduce
appropriability and discourage R&D by the selling industry. This is not likely to be the case
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when seller market power is high”. Next, we want to find empirical evidence for this
statement.
IV. Empirical Model and Data Description
The econometric estimations are based on data of an empirical survey for the German
automobile industry carried out in 1995 (Peters 1996). The survey aimed at measuring the
effects of the conditions of competition and technological capabilities on automobile
innovation behavior in general and specifically the effects of appropriability conditions and
supplier-buyer relationships. Out of an initial sample of 1,306 automobile suppliers, 460 firms
returned the questionnaire. After having excluded firms in the fields of engineering,
consulting and tuning, 401 suppliers of automobile parts remained.4
Innovative Activitiy
Our survey evidently shows quite a number of indicators for the innovative behavior of firms.
Four of these indicators are used in this paper. They refer to innovation input as well as
innovation output, giving a more sophisticated picture of the effects of buyer market power on
the innovative behavior of automobile suppliers.
The input of innovation processes is measured by the R&D employment intensity (R&D_INT)
as well as the innovation intensity (INNO_INT) of suppliers. The R&D employment intensity
relates to the percentage of employees performing R&D tasks within or outside R&D
departments. As our survey does not operate with full-time equivalents, using the R&D
intensity can lead to an overestimation of the R&D input in small firms. As Felder et al.
(1996, p. 132) remark, in small firms „R&D tasks and non-R&D tasks are often assigned to
the same employee“ which is not taken into account here.
The innovation intensity captures further characteristics of firms’ innovation input. Herewith
criticism is refuted that firms not only need to perform R&D for a successful introduction of
new products and processes, but also in related fields, such as design and conception,
construction, engineering and fabrication of prototypes, as well as trial production and pilot
plants, which are only under some circumstances part of R&D, in the sense of the Frascati
Manual (OECD 1993; Kleinknecht and Bain 1993). The innovation intensity used in our
paper are based on those financial means the automobile suppliers raised in 1994 for R&D
and the other activities described.5 To evaluate the innovation intensity the innovation
                    
4 We define automobile suppliers as firms producing parts, components, subsystems, materials or tools, which
enter directly or indirectly in an automobile.
5 In the OSLO-Manual activities for patenting and licensing as well as staff training are also part of the
innovation process (cf. König and Licht 1995). These activities, however, are not taken into account here,
because they do not refer to the course of the innovation process (Clark and Fujimoto 1991).
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expenses were related to the sales the firms made in 1994 with automobile products only. As
variables to measure innovation output, we use data on the successful market introduction of
product innovations (PROD_IN) and on the successful implementation of process innovations
(PROC_IN). An innovative supplier is defined as a firm which has introduced new or
improved products or processes in 1993 or 1994. These indicators have the advantage of
showing the actual realization of new products and processes as opposed to the patent
indicator which only measures the registered patents (cf. Acs and Audretsch 1990; König and
Licht 1995).
Our effort to control measurable inter-firm differences in buyer and market structure,
appropriability conditions, and technological opportunity restrict the size of our sample. Data
were available for only subsets of suppliers because some of them did not answer all
questions. Further, in some models we restrict our attention to innovating firms only. The
reduction of the entire sample led to some modifications to the innovation indicators (cf.
Table 1). For example, the share of the non-innovative firms was reduced moderatly from
13.2 per cent to 12.1 percent. The drop in the variance of the innovation intensity can be
explained by the exclusion of two firms which both invested 30.0 per cent of their sales in
R&D.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Market Structure, Appropriability and Technological Capabilitiy
For the empirical analysis we assume a causal relationship between the innovation input as
well as innovation output and the factors on the right side as follows:
innovation input/output = f(SMC, BMC, AP, TCO, A)
              (+/-)     (+/-)   (+)     (+)  (+/-)
where SMC = parameter of suppliers’ market structure, BMC = parameter of buyers’ market
structure, AP = degree of appropriability of suppliers’ innovation rent, TCO = conditions of
technological capability and opportunity, and A = conditions regarding firm size, degree of
inter-industry diversity, demand schedules etc.). The expected signs of the determinants of
innovation are in brackets.
Table 2 shows the exogenous variables used in the estimations, and Table 3 shows the
descriptive statistics of these variables. Data on market structure were drawn from the survey
as well as from a publication of the German Monopoly Commission for the year 1991. The
concentration in the domestic supplier markets are measured by the Herfindahl index,
computed for the lines of business (SCR). Where such a classification was not feasible, the
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SCR of the respective two-digit industry was used. To describe the situation of suppliers in
their home and foreign main market we use a dummy variable characterizing oligopolistically
structured markets with 1 to 10 competitors (COMP_H).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Special attention was paid to the inclusion of the demand conditions of the suppliers. On the
basis of lines of business a sales weighted CR3-concentration index of the domestic markets
was depicted (BCR). The weights of buyer concentration index relate to the shares of
suppliers’ output, made directly with car makers, commercial vehicles or with first- and
second-tier suppliers in 1994. The advantage of BCR over comparable variables of demand
power (cf. Farber 1981, Lustgarten 1975) is on the direct registration of firm related,
monopsonistic buyer market power of the automobile suppliers. Further, a dummy was
introduced to define all suppliers with more than 10 customers within the automobile industry
(CUST_H). This variable does not only reflect the potential demand power of buyers (the
possibility of opportunistic behavior declines with the number of customers), but also the size
of the automobile specific markets. We therefore expect the coefficient of CUST_H to be
positive. To measure the effects of interaction of the concentration in the (domestic) supplier
and buyer markets we multiplicate the concentration indices. We suggest a positive sign of the
coefficient of SCR*BCR but a negative sign of the individual coefficient of BCR.
Closely connected with the demand power of buyers are the appropriability conditions. In
general, the conditions of appropriability are determined by the possibility of patenting
innovations, the complexity of the design, the immediate introduction into the market, the
secrecy of technological know-how, long-term work contracts, as well as contractual seller-
buyer-relations (cf. Cohen 1995, Levin et al. 1985, König and Licht 1995). This list is far from
being complete. Since automobile supplier products are usually custom-tailored, the design of
supplier contracts is most important for innovation returns.6
A dummy variable was introduced, characterizing suppliers, which use long-term contracts
(model life contracts over 3 to 5 years) to a higher extent than short-term contracts
(APPROP_C). The firms were also asked to declare to which extent they were confronted
with declining revenues in 1993 and 1994 due to price pressure of the buyers (APPROP_P).
Here the assessment ranged on a a Likert-scale starting from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a high
degree). The respective scale values were used as regressors.
                    
6 We have already mentioned that patents in the automobile sector are far less important than in other sectors.
Moreover, only the innovative enterprises had to comment on the effectiveness of patents in the survey
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Also variables were intended to capture dimensions of the technological opportunity of
markets and of firms’ technological capabilities. Unfortunately, no data were available about
the closeness to science and the importance of external sources of technological knowledge
(Arvanitis and Hollenstein 1994; Klevorick et al. 1995). Instead, industrial effects of
technological opportunity were measured by the contribution of factor specific, technological
know-how for industrial research. These data are taken from a publication of Meyer-Krahmer
and Wessels (1989), in which they examined the intersectoral integration between the
technology suppliers and takers in Germany using the industrial distribution of price adjusted
stocks of R&D-capital. Using their classification, a dummy variable was intended to reflect
the lines of business chemicals, automobile parts and automobile electronics as having above
average stocks of R&D-capital (R&D_CAP).
Primarily, we measured the technological capabilities of firms with responses to questions
concerning the share of sales of automobile parts, developed exclusively by the suppliers
(TEC_SUPP) or custom-tailored (TEC_CUST). Custom-tailored products are also called
black-box products, where the buyers only fix the successful characteristics of the
intermediate products and leave the development as such to their suppliers (Clark and
Fujimoto 1991). The features of the products reflected different aspects. First, according to
Cusumano (1989), automobile suppliers with high technological capabilities should be able to
make higher R&D efforts with their own developed and black-box products than firms with
low technological abilities which mainly produce parts, which are controlled in all details by
their customers. Second, the variables intended to reflect the contribution of buyers as an
external information source for the suppliers’ innovation activity  and hence the locus of
innovation (von Hippel 1988). Third, it should be mentioned that the various specifications of
automobile parts other than technological opportunity also catch aspects of demand (Cohen
1995; von Hippel 1988). So, automobile parts produced through own supplier drawings may
be less customer-specific than detail-controlled or black-box products. Consequently, they can
be offered to a larger number of customers, reducing the potential opportunistic behavior of
the buyers (Williamson 1989).
The technological capability/opportunity established internally by the suppliers is included by
a dummy variable (TEC_INT). It subsumes those firms doing regular basic research or
experimental development in formal R&D departments. In addition, they call themselves
development suppliers.
The estimations are also controlled by differences in business unit size. As a proxy variable
for business unit size the sales of automobile parts (in logs) is chosen (SIZE). This catches the
effect of the automobile sector specific firm size (cf. Cohen et al. 1987). Using the logged
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number of employees, which relates to the entire firm, led to similar results. As the literature
does not offer a standard economic interpretation of size effects, business unit size can be
used as a proxy for various economic effects and therefore can have ambiguous effects on
suppliers’ innovation activities (Arvanitis and Hollenstein 1994; Felder et al. 1996). In order
to control intersectoral synergy effects with the development of new products and processes,
the dummy DIVERS was included, reflecting all suppliers having made less than 40% of their
sales with automobile parts in 1994. Highly diversified suppliers should have better
opportunities to make use of know-how coming from other sectors for the realization of
automobile specific innovation.
V. Estimation Issues and Results
Two statistical problems arose as we estimated our specification of the innovation input. First,
some of the automobile suppliers had no expenditures on R&D and other innovation activities
even if they had successfully introduced new products or processes in 1993 or 1994. An
estimation of the intensities, containing firms with positive innovation expenses only, would
lead to a truncation of the error terms and to biased parameter values. Accepting a
misspecification of the model, the problem can be solved by using a Tobit model. The
possible misspecification lies in the fact that independent parameters simultaneously
determine the probability as well as the expenditures of innovation activities (Cohen et al.
1987; Arvanitis and Hollenstein 1994).
A second statistical problem arose since after using a likelihood-ratio test the hypothesis of
homoscedasticity in the error terms had to be rejected. Moreover, it became evident that a
certain structure of multiplicative heteroscedasticity in the restricted as well as in the
unrestricted sample can be found. Here the log of the variance of error terms could be depicted
as a linear function of business unit size as well as the concentration indices of domestic
markets. A binary Probit model was used for estimating innovation outputs (PROD_INN and
PROC_INN). The determination of maximum-likelihood values was done by implementing
the numerical Newton-Raphson procedure.
Innovation Expenditure and R&D Employment
Our estimation strategy is to fit regression models for two different samples containing
innovative as well as non-innovative suppliers yet with the same set of parameters. The Tobit
estimates of the effects of supplier and buyer market concentration, appropriability conditions,
technological capability/opportunity, and other characteristics on automobile supplier’s
innovation intensity and on their R&D-employment intensity are shown in Table 4.
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The coefficients of the variables representing the supplier and buyer market structure on the
innovation intensity are individually and jointly significant at the 0.05 resp. 0.1 level across
both models. The expectation that buyer market power has a negative effect on innovative
efforts is supported by the estimation of the innovation intensity, but only weakly. The signs
of the coefficients for BCR and SCR*BCR show that the innovation expenditures per unit of
sales will fall with rising buyer markets concentration, if automobile supplier markets are low-
concentrated. But the innovation intensity will rise with an increasing buyer concentration, if
supplier markets are highly concentrated. The effect of the supplier concentration on the
innovation intensity is as well dependent on the concentration of the buyer markets, as the
sign of the coefficients for SCR and the interaction term SCR*BCR shows. A high supplier
concentration reduces (stimulates) the firms’ innovation intensity, if the buyer markets are
lowly (highly) concentrated. These effects are more evident for the larger sample containing
innovative as well as non-innovative firms than for the smaller sample containg only
innovative firms.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The data also give information about the effects of competition on the domestic and foreign
markets. German automobile suppliers acting on oligopolistically structured domestic and
foreign markets seem to invest more in their innovation process than other suppliers. There is
a significant positive influence of COMP_H in the estimation of the innovation intensity of
innovative as well as non-innovative firms (model 1) but not for the sample of innovative
firms (model 2).
The estimations suggest that the market structure variables SCR and COMP_H reflect
different aspects of supplier competition. While the Herfindahl index on an aggregated level
only measures the general conditions in the domestic good sectors, the dummy variable which
reflects suppliers acting on tight oligopolistic markets relates to the market constellations both
at home and abroad. In addition, suppliers in lowly concentrated four-digit industries may
only have a small number of rivals in their main markets if they produce differentiated inputs.
A large stock of customers influences the innovative efforts positively. Suppliers operating
with many customers are faced with a lower opportunistic behavior of their buyers, improving
their ability to appropriate sufficiently high innovation returns. As expected, the potential
utilization of the innovation and the speed of adoption new technologies seems to be higher,
the more potential buyers are available. This, however, requires implicitly low costs for
suppliers to switch among buyers (Riordan and Sappington 1989; Williamson 1989).
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In principle, the estimation results of the suppliers and buyer market structure (concentration)
on the R&D employment intensity follow a similar pattern to that of the innovation intensity
but with lower statistical significance. The signs of the coefficients of the variables which
capture the effects of market concentration are conformable in all models. But in all
estimations of the R&D employment intensity the coefficient of the buyer concentration was
not significant. Thus, buyer concentration gains only a we k positive impact in interaction
with a high seller concentration. Contrary to the findings in the estimations on the innovation
intensity neither a positive effect of competition on the domestic and foreign suppliers
markets nor of a large stock of customers was found in the models of the R&D employment
intensity.
As a provisional outcome, the estimations on the R&D employment intensity and on the
innovation expenditures per unit of sales for the German automobile supply industry confirm
the results of Farber (1981) who found the same effects of supplier and buyer concentration on
R&D employment intensity for fifty U.S. four-digit industries. In our data however, the
impacts of buyer concentration are stronger in the models of explaining the innovation
intensity than the R&D efforts, as well as for the sample containing innovative and non-
innovative suppliers than for the sample containing innovative suppliers only. The latter
finding suggests that supplier and buyer market structure may affect the probability to realize
an innovation to a larger extent than the intensity of innovation activities.7 In addition, the
Wald Test shows that the explaining power of the variables representing buyer and seller
market structure is only moderate in the sample of innovative suppliers.
Next we will comment on appropriability and buyer power. In the empirical models for
innovation intensity the coefficient of the variable reflecting the contractual appropriability
shows neither a significant influence nor do the coefficients of APPROP_C have the positive
signs expected. However, the realization of long-term contracts strongly stimulates a
supplier’s decision to invest in R&D. Thus, for the German automobile industry, the data find
no unambiguous support for the findings of recent case studies which suggest that long-term
contracts should improve the relationship between suppliers and their customers (automakers),
and thus, the appropriability of innovation returns (Dyer 1996; McMillan 1990). Only, the less
firms fear that the time of amortization of R&D costs is too short the more they will invest in
their (formal) R&D activities. Also Felder et al. (1996) found no effect of their appropriability
                    
7 Instead of a Tobit model we can also use a Heckman-type model which can identify the parameters of
suppliers’ participation in the innovation process and the intensity of their efforts separately. But the firms’
participation refers to the decision to invest in the innovation process or not (independently, if they had realized
an innovation in 1993 or 1994) but not to the probability that suppliers will be innovative. Thus, also non-
innovative suppliers can unsuccessfully invest in the innovation process or innovative suppliers do not have to
spend on R&D.
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measure on innovation intensity but on R&D intensity although they use other specifications
of their appropriability measures.
In other estimations, not reported in Table 4, we replace APPROP_C by a dummy,
characterizing all suppliers using balanced shares of short- and long-term contracts. By this
we tested the hypothesis of the OECD (1983) that by using long-term contracts the
dependence on buyers increases for suppliers, especially for smaller suppliers. This market
power may give buyers incentives for opportunistic behavior which reduces the willingness of
suppliers to invest in R&D. Our data for German automobile suppliers gives us only little
support for this hypothesis. Indeed, automobile suppliers having balanced shares of short- and
long-term contracts, show higher innovation intensities but this impact is only significant at
the 0.12 level. Using a dummy, which characterizes all suppliers using more short-term
contracts compared to long-term contracts, also yields negative (insignificant) signs of the
coefficients in the estimations of the innovation expenditures per unit of sales. Thus, the data
cannot confirm a strictly positive impact of using long-term contracts on the innovation input,
allowing for a better appropriability of innovation returns.
There is, however, a stronger indication in the data that price-related buyer power
(APPROP_P) has negative effects on innovation expenditures, and especially on the R&D
employment intensity. A current adverse business situation reduces the financial potential to
carry out R&D and innovation activities. If the profit expectations are also coupled with the
current business situation, price pressure of buyers will reduce innovative efforts because of
worse (financial) demand expectations which confirm Schmookler’s hypothesis. This
relationship, however, is weaker for the models in the estimation of the innovation intensity
than for the models in the estimation of the R&D employment intensity.
Now we look at the technological capability of firms and at the technological opportunity of
markets. The estimates show that the suppliers’ technological capability associated with the
degree of supplier integration into the development of new products (TEC_CUST and
TEC_SUPP) as well as with the capacities established internally (TEC_INT) determines their
innovation expenditure as well as their R&D intensity significantly. Higher shares of
automobile parts which are developed supplier-own or custom-tailored as well as higher
internal R&D-capacities stimulate the suppliers’ innovative efforts. But the positive impact of
internal R&D capacities is weaker in explaining the variances in the innovation input for
innovative suppliers (model 2). The coefficient estimates of the technological opportunity
R&D_CAP have insignificant effects in all models. Automobile suppliers operating in lines of
business with above average R&D capital stocks seem to have no higher innovative and R&D
efforts than other firms.
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Finally, the effects of business unit size (SIZE) and intersectoral diversification (DIVERS) are
mentioned. While DIVERS is not significantly positive in the estimations of the innovation
input, there is a highly significant influence of suppliers’ firm size in automobile parts. We
observe a strongly negative impact in the investment in innovation and R&D activities with
growing business unit size. But we have not controlled the non-linearity of the intensity and
firm size relationship whichwas found by Felder et al. (1996) in the (West) German
manufacturing industries.
The Probability of Realizing an Innovation
Table 5 presents the binary Probit estimates of the same determinants discussed so far on the
realization of product and process innovation. Contrary to the findings in the estimations of
the innovation input, the coefficients of the concentration variables are individual and jointly
insignificant at the 0.1 level across the Probit estimation of the probability of product and
process innovations. Only the seller concentration affects the probability of realizing a process
innovation. Remarkably, in this model the terms of the seller and buyer concentration have the
opposite signs than in the empirical models for innovation and R&D employment intensity but
in principle have lost their statistical significance. Domestic seller and buyer concentration
does not explain inter-firm differences in the probability of realizing an innovation. Thus, the
lower significance of the interaction of buyer/supplier concentration in the estimations of the
intensities for the sample containing innovative suppliers (model 1 in Table 4) compared to
the sample of innovative and non-innovative suppliers (model 2 in Table 4) can not be
explained by an larger impact of domestic market concentration on the probability of realizing
an innovation.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
In summary, the regressions show that buyer (seller) concentration - in interaction with seller
(buyer) concentration - affects the innovation input but the effect is lost when estimating the
innovation output. But although the indicators of domestic market concentration lack on
statistical significance, automobile suppliers acting on oligopolistically structured domestic
and foreign markets seem to have higher probabilities of realizing an innovation than
suppliers operating in markets with a large number of competitors. The results of other
surveys, signalling insignificant effects of supplier market structures on innovation output,
may therefore be biased due to measurement problems (Arvanitis and Hollenstein 1994;
Felder et al. 1996; Geroski 1990). But, the data give no strong evidence for the Neo-
Schumpeter hypothesis that firms with high market power are more innovative than other
firms.
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The probability of realizing a process innovation is larger for suppliers with a large stock of
customers than for those with only few customers. However ths effect is lost when estimating
the probability of realizing a product innovation. If we assume that the stock of customers is
also an indicator for the suppliers’ size of the automobile market, we can explain the positive
effect of a large stock of customers by the suggestion of Klepper (1996). He states that the
incentives of firms to invest in process innovations increase with the size of their output
because innovation rents are connected to the current output if the innovator can use its
generated knowledge inhouse only. Thus, it is more likely for firms with a larger stock of
customers to realize a process innovation than for firms with only few customers.
Klepper’s (1996) argument is also confirmed by the significant effects of the size of business
units. Whereas larger firms invest less in their R&D and innovation process we observe an
increasing probability for the realization of process (as well as product) innovation with
growing business units. This is conformable to results of other empirical studies, signalling a
lower probability of realization of product innovations for small and medium firms compared
to large firms, but having higher innovation and R&D intensities (Cohen 1995; Felder et al.
1996; Kleinknecht and Bain 1993). The positive (negative) sign of the coefficient of the
business unit size on the realization of new automobile parts (innovation input) is evident,
although the share of small and medium sized firms is smaller in the subsamples compared to
the entire sample.8
Now we want to consider the effects of appropriability. First, suppliers with long-termed
contracts have higher probabilities of realizing process innovations but not of realizing
product innovations or investing more in their innovation process. Second, a high price
pressure reduces the suppliers’ incentives to engage in the innovation process and to realize a
product innovation. This relationship, however, cannot be observed with the estimation of the
probability to realize a process innovation. Therefore, the estimations cannot confirm the
results of some case studies that the demand of German automakers for high price reducement
encourages suppliers to realize innovation returns by improving their production processes
(e.g. Scientific Consulting 1995).
Not surprisingly, we also observe a strongly increasing probability for the realization of
product as well as process innovation with higher technological capabilities. It is striking,
however, that the realization of process innovations is a negative function of the shares of
sales of automobile parts developed exclusively by the supplier or developed custom-tailored.
It seems that those suppliers who mainly produce automobile parts from customer drawings,
                    
8 It was tested, whether small and medium sized suppliers are under-represented in the subsample. Out of the
initial sample of 401 firms, the share in the subsamples reduces from 8.5 % to 7-7.5 %.
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specialize their innovative efforts on the development of new processes by trying to take the
position as a cost leader.
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks
For the first time, the effects of buyer and seller power, appropriability, and the technological
capability/opportunity on the innovation behavior of German automobile suppliers have been
estimated. Contrary to the econometric study of Farber (1981) we use variables representing
firms’ innovation input as well as innovation output, yielding a more sophisticated picture for
the models estimated. It was shown that suppliers’ innovation intensity may decline with
buyer market concentration when the supplier market is of low concentration, but may
increase with buyer market concentration when the supplier market is concentrated. In
principle, these effects were also found in the estimations of the R&D employment intensity
but with lower statistical significance. However, an impact of domestic buyer or seller market
concentration was not observable by the estimations on the indicators of the innovation
output. Further we found that automobile suppliers in oligopolistically structured domestic
and foreign markets reveal higher innovation activities and that the size of the suppliers’ stock
of customers stimulates their innovative behavior.
Estimating the effects of buyers behavior regarding the appropriability conditions of
innovation returns we confirmed that long-term contracts positively influence the R&D
employment intensity and the suppliers’ probability of realizing a process innovation. But they
have negative (insignificant) effects on the innovation expenditures per unit sales and on the
probability of realizing a product innovation. However higher price pressure of buyers reduces
the incentives of suppliers to invest in innovation and R&D activities, and reduces the
probability of realizing product innovations. In controlling the estimates for the suppliers’
technological capability/opportunity we found that a higher technological capability stimulates
the firms’ innovative efforts. The data also revealed that there is a lower probability for small
and medium automobile suppliers to innovate, but that they invest more heavily in their
innovation and R&D activities than larger suppliers.
The data give an indication that in analysing innovation processes we have to bear in mind the
vertical interaction of decisions and structures. Buyer market power and especially its
interaction with seller concentration has an impact on the innovative efforts of suppliers. But
it seems that buyer concentration can explain only a small fraction of inter-firm differences in
innovation activities. Also, the effects of the conditions of competition on buyer and seller
markets differ, depending on the innovation indicators used. So Farber’s (1981) findings
could be confirmed rather with the estimation of innovation intensity and - with some cuts - of
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R&D employment intensity. On the other hand, the innovation output depends rather on the
technological capability/opportunity and on the size of firms than on buyer concentration.
However, to obtain a better understanding of the interaction between seller and buyer power
on innovative behavior we have to use more sophisticated indicators representing these
effects.
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Appendix: List of Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Innovation Intensity and on the Realization of Product and Process
Innovation by Samples
Innovation R&D Employment Realization of new
Intensity Intensity Products and/or
Processes
Products Processes
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
352 286 248 368 300 268 401 314 401 314 401 314
Mean 0.050 0.049 0.054 0.049 0.051 0.055 No 13.2% 12.1% 21.9% 20.7% 25.4% 24.2%
Std. dev.  0.043 0.038 0.038 0.049 0.050 0.051 Yes 86.8% 87.9% 78.1% 79.3% 74.6% 75.8%
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.300 0.200 0.200 0.300 0.300 0.300
Remark: * Only 352 (368) suppliers out of the unrestricted sample of 401 firms gave responses to their innovation expenditures or automobile
sales (R&D-employment or full size employment).
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Table 2: List of Variables and Description
Variable Short Description of the Variable Value
Conditions on suppliers markets
SIZE Firm size; Sales of automobile parts (in log) Metric
DIVERS Inter-industry diversification; Low shares of production of automobile
parts regarding to the whole sales of suppliers (1 = shares smaller than
40%, 0 = otherwise)
Nominal
SCR Domestic supplier concentration; Herfindahl index based on the level of
business unit
Metric
COMP_H Supplier concentration in domestic and foreign markets; Responses to a
question concerning the number of  Competitors home and abroad
(1 = 1 - 10 competitors, 0 = otherwise)
Nominal
Conditions on buyer markets
BCR Domestic buyer concentration; sales weighted CR3-concentration index of
domestic buyer markets (lines of business)
Metric
SCR*BCR Interaction of domestic supplier and buyer concentration Metric
CUST_H Stock of Customers; Responses to a question concerning the number of
Customers home and abroad (1 = more than 10 customers, 0 = otherwise) Nominal
Appropriability conditions
APPROP_C Contractural appropriation of innovation return; Relative importance of
long-term contracts (model-life contracts with a time of delivery of 3 and 5
years) regarding to short term contracts of one year or less; (1 = higher
importance of long-term contracts;  0 = otherwise)
Nominal
APPROP_P Appropriation of innovation return by input prices; Responses on a seven
point Likert scale to a question concerning lower rates of returns because




TEC_INT R&D-capabilities established internally by the suppliers (1 = R&D-
department, periodical activities in R&D, and evaluation as development
supplier,  0 = otherwise)
Nominal
TEC_SUPP Shares of supplier-own developed automobile products Metric
TEC_CUST Shares of automobile products which are developed by suppliers at
customers specifications (black-box products)
Metric
Technological opportunitiy of Industries
R&D_CAP Lines of business having above average stocks of R&D-capital (1 =
chemicals, automobile parts and automobile electronics, 0 = otherwise)
Nominal
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Regressors
Variable Innovation Intensity R&D Employment Intensity Innovation output
N=286 N=248 N=300 N=268 N=314
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
SIZE 6.28 1.72 6.25 1.70 6.27 1.69 6.43 1.66 6.25 1.70 1.10 12.04
DIVERS 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.00 1.00
SCR 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.77 0.70 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.71 0.77 0.04 2.81
COMP_H 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.71 0.00 1.00
BCR 0.64 0.12 0.64 0.12 0.64 0.12 0.65 0.11 0.64 0.12 0.40 0.88
CUST_H 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.00 1.00
SCR*BCR 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.02 2.21
APPROP_C 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.00 1.00
APPROP_P 5.76 1.57 5.73 1.61 5.75 1.58 5.67 1.61 5.73 1.61 1.00 7.00
TEC_INT 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.39 0.00 1.00
TEC_CUST 23.22 29.19 23.11 29.81 22.68 29.81 22.93 29.07 23.11 29.81 0.00 100.00
TEC_SUPP 33.44 36.17 33.67 36.71 34.27 36.71 36.99 36.89 33.67 36.71 0.00 100.00
R&D_CAP 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.00 1.00
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Table 4: The Effects of Supplier and Buyer Market Power, Appropriability, Technological
Opportunity, and Firm Size on the Innovation Input
Variables Coefficients  (Standard Deviation)
INNO_INT R&D_INT






































































































































Remark: Level of significance: * significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, ***
significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 5: The Effects of Supplier and Buyer Market Power, Appropriability, Technological
Opportunity, and Firm Size on the Realization of Product and Process Innovation







































































Remark: Level of significance: * significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, ***
significant at the 0.01 level.
